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The purpose of this article is to explain the decrease in the fixed exchange rate regimes we
have experienced the last decades. Our econometric approach is duration analysis, and  the
explanatory variables used are taken from the literature on optimum currency areas. The
sample consists of 51 countries and covers the period 1973-1995. The degree of openness
proves to be the most influential variable.  Increasing openness by 1% decreases the hazard
for adopting a floating exchange rate by 1.29%, i.e. an elasticity of –1.29. The size of a
country and the inflationary differential against foreign countries are also significant. But the
corresponding elasticities (0.19 and 0.25) are considerably lower than for openness.
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Gary Fournier and Kyrre Rickertsen for helpful
comments.
* Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgate 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
** Statistics Norway, Box 8131 Dep., N-0033 Oslo, Norway
Corresponding author: Erling Vårdal. E-mail: erling.vardal@econ.uib.no2
1. INTRODUCTION
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system a growing number of countries have
chosen to let their exchange rates float.  In 1973, 19 (15%) of the 128 members of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were classified as floating exchange rate regimes. In 1995
the number of IMF-members had increased to 180, of which 98 (54 %) were counted as
floating regimes. Most of the increase in floating regimes was due to the fact that the “1973-
member-countries” had changed status from fixed to float. The purpose of this article is to
explain this process empirically.
During the last decades we have seen a marked liberalization in international financial
markets. A common view is that it is difficult for countries, which have chosen to deregulate
financial markets, to fix the exchange rate (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)). Thus, the increase in
capital mobility may explain the increase in floating regimes. But there are other explanations,
mainly found in the literature on optimum currency areas. Here it is discussed when a fixed
contrary to a floating exchange rate is advantageous for a country. Based on this discussion a
set of criteria has been developed. The basic premise of this article is that authorities make
rational choices, and we therefore expect that countries choose exchange rate regimes
according to these criteria.
In the literature the degree of openness seems to be considered as the most important
criterion. The larger the degree of openness the more advantageous it is to fix the exchange
rate (McKinnon (1963) and Krugman (1990)).  Second, we have the size of a country. The
smaller a country, the more advantageous it is to have a fixed exchange rate. Small countries
are less stable and more prone to speculation (Mundell (1960)). In addition small countries are
not able to affect foreign prices, and therefore the terms of trade, by exchange rate policy
(McKinnon (1963)).  Consequently, the benefit of a change in the exchange rate can be
questioned. For small countries the cost of keeping the exchange rate fixed is therefore of a3
minor magnitude. The third criterion is structural concentration of production. Here, there is
disagreement in the literature as to the sign of this effect. The traditional argument by Kenen
(1969) is that specialization in the production calls for a floating exchange rate. On the other
hand, Heller (1977) argues that for developing countries specialization means unstable export
earnings and the need is therefore a fixed exchange rate. The fourth criterion is geographical
concentration in trade, which has been used in the empirical literature on optimum currency
areas (Heller (1978)). Heller argues that more concentration calls for a fixed exchange rate.
Difference in the rate of inflation between the home country and foreign countries is the fifth
criterion. Here, fixed exchange rates require that this difference is small, see Fleming (1971)
and Corden (1972). As a sixth variable we mention the degree of economic development.
According to Holden, Holden and Suss (1979) the less the degree of development, the
stronger is the need for a fixed exchange rate.  The last criterion we shall focus on is the
degree of capital mobility. As mentioned, a common view is that  fixed exchange rates are
costly to uphold if capital mobility is perfect, (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)). This is opposed
to the view in the early stage of the literature on optimal currency areas. In Mundell (1960)
and Mundell (1961) it is argued that a high degree of capital mobility calls for fixed rates.
(Table 1 about here)
There has been quite a few studies using the previous criteria to explain the actual
choice of exchange rate regimes. Early review articles of the literature are given by Edison
(1989) and Edison and Melvin (1990).  Table 1 summarizes the studies.  If a study reports
several estimated models we have chosen to present the model that is most comparable to
what is found in other studies.
Country size, inflation differential and production concentration are the most
successful variables. All studies that report these variables come up with the expected signs.
The estimate of the country size is significant at the 5 % level in two of five cases, while the4
estimate of the inflation differential is significant at the 5 % level in two of four cases. In the
case of production concentration two out of six studies give a significant effect at the 5 %
level. For the other variables the results are mixed. Openness and geographical diversification
show up with a wrong sign in two out of seven cases. For capital mobility only Bosco (1987)
reports a significant estimate with a positive sign.
1
The various studies differ as to how many countries are included and the time period
covered by the analyses. While Dreyer (1978), Bosco (1987) and Savvides (1990) only  look
at developing countries, the other studies include all countries.
A common thread is that various types of cross-sectional analysis have been used.
Heller (1978) uses discriminant analysis, while Dreyer (1978), Bosco (1987) and Honkapohja
and Pikkarainen (1992) use discrete choice models. A weakness with the statistical techniques
used is that they are static, which means that they only give a snapshot of the actual situation.
If this picture shall be valid the underlying process must be in statistical equilibrium, which
means that the various states must be constant over time, even if countries may change
exchange rate regime.  As described in the first paragraph of this section, this is not the case.
The assumption of statistical equilibrium therefore seems not to be validated in the data.
Our econometric approach will be duration analysis, which is better suited to take care
of the dynamic nature of the problem.  Duration analysis is similar to static categorical
response models like the logit or probit: both types of models consider discrete outcomes. In
                                                
1 In the studies not only variables from the optimum currency literature are used.  Melvin (1985) included price
shocks.  He divided the exchange rate regimes into three groups, and estimated a logit-model with only domestic
and foreign price shocks as explanatory variables.  He found a positive relationship between domestic price
shocks and a fixed exchange rate and for foreign price shocks this relationship was negative.  The inclusion of
four variables from the theory of optimum currency areas added no explanatory power.  However, a model
consisting of only these variables showed satisfactory results.  Savvides (1990) postulated that the variance in the
real exchange rate was simultaneously determined with the exchange rate regime, and these variables were
treated as endogenously determined.  The equation for explaining the exchange rate regime included domestic
and foreign price shocks, in addition to five variables from the theory of optimal currency areas.  The results as
to price shocks support the results from Melvin.  However, in the case of Savvides the extra variables from the
optimum currency approach added significantly to the equation.5
the present case, the outcome is either a fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime. However,
categorical response models address an outcome at some point (or period) of time, contingent
on the values of the explanatory variables. In duration analysis the time of the response (the
transition from fixed to flexible exchange rates) is incorporated into the model, moreover, the
explanatory variables are allowed to vary over time. It is also possible to investigate if the
passage of time affects the probability of changing regime.
The organization of the paper now is: the next section considers the method in greater
detail. Section 3 accounts for the data treatment, Section 4 contains the empirical results, and
Section 5 briefly summarizes our main findings.
2. METHOD
Assume that initially a country is in one state (fixed exchange rate) and may change into
another state (flexible exchange rate) at any point in time. Let the random variable T ˛ (0, ¥)
denote the time spent in the initial state, i.e. the duration of the fixed exchange rate regime. At
T the transition occurs. Let  f(t) and  F(t)  denote the probability density function and the
cumulative density function, respectively. It is also useful to define the survivor function, S(t)
= 1 – F(t). In the present analysis we focus on the hazard rate. (For expositional simplicity, we
postpone the introduction of explanatory variables.) The hazard rate, or transition rate,  ) (t q ,
is the limit of the probability per time unit that the transition takes place in a small interval
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Note that  t denotes process time, not calendar time. Also note that we assume that all
countries are in the fixed exchange regime initially, and that we only consider one potential
event (a transition into the floating regime). The model may be extended to repeated events,
but that will not be considered here. The typical pattern is that once in a floating exchange
rate regime, a country stays that way.
Even though transitions may occur at any point in time, in applications it may be
necessary to group them in intervals because data do not permit to pinpoint the exact dates.
This is also the case in the present analysis. It is then necessary to work with discrete hazards.
Define the discrete, or grouped, hazard,  t l , as the probability that a transition occurs in the
interval  [t, t+1), conditional on no transition until t. Using (3), it may be shown that
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2 For proofs, see, e.g., Lancaster (1990).7
There are several ways to specify the hazard rate. We use a proportional hazard model
with flexible baseline. Assume that the hazard depends on a vector x(t) of potentially time-
varying exogenous variables. The proportional hazard model is then
(5)  )), ( exp( ) ( ) , ( 0 t t t x ß' x q q =
where b is a vector of coefficients, and  ) ( 0 t q  is the baseline hazard. The baseline hazard
determines the time dependence of the hazard. We assume here that  ) ( 0 t q  is some unknown
positive function. An obvious special case is when  ) ( 0 t q  is a constant, another special case is
the Weibull hazard. To develop the discrete analogy of (5), assume that x(t) stays constant at











t du u q g  Using this definition, normalizing [t, t+1) to unity,
and inserting (5) into (4) yields
(6)  [ ]. ) exp( exp 1 t t t x ß' + - - = g l
The parameters of the model may be estimated by maximum likelihood. Testing if the
baseline hazard is time-varying or constant,  ,   , : H0 t t " = g g  is straightforward.
The sampling strategy is important when estimating duration models. In particular,
left-censoring poses problems. Left-censoring occurs when an observational unit enters the
estimating sample after t = 0 and leads to a downward bias in the estimated hazard rate. It is
therefore important that the starting time of the process is known. As we argue in the next
section, 1973 is a natural starting point, thus left censoring is not a problem. Right-censoring,8
on the other hand, the fact that all countries cannot be observed until a transition takes place,
is well taken care of in the maximum likelihood estimation procedure.
3
3. DATA AND DEFINITIONS
We have relied on IMF’s  Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions for information on exchange rate regime. Here the end-of-the-year exchange rate
regime is reported, based on information obtained from the member countries. A problem is
that there is not always accordance between the reported regime and the exchange rate policy
actually being practised. Countries with an alleged floating exchange rate have been known to
intervene regularly in the foreign exchange market, while ostensible peggers have allowed the
exchange rate to vary within such wide bands that the peg imposes practically no restrictions
on the movements of the exchange rate. Despite this weakness there does not seem to be a
better source for information on exchange rate regime. As a consequence, the maximum
number of countries in the analyses is limited to 112 – the number of countries that have been
IMF-members during the whole period.
As opposed to the theory of optimum currency areas, IMF does not use the simple
dichotomy of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. Instead, the countries are classified in
5 to 10 different categories. These categories represent different degrees of exchange rate
flexibility, and in some cases it is hard to decide if they should be classified as fixed or
floating exchange rate regimes. This applies in particular for so called “crawling-peg”-
regimes. A crawling peg is a fixed exchange rate that is changed at relatively frequent
intervals, hence this regime has the characteristics of both a fixed and a floating exchange
                                                
3 For a derivation of the likelihood function, see e.g. Jenkins (1995).9
rate. To avoid this problem we have decided to leave out regimes characterized by ”crawling
peg”.
Another borderline case is the managed floating. We have decided to define this as
floating mainly for two reasons: In the years 1973 to 1981 managed and freely floating
exchange rates were put together in the  residual category of ”exchange rate not maintained
within relatively narrow margins”. Also - because we have omitted ”crawling peg” - this gives
a clearer distinction between the two groups of exchange rate regimes. Accordingly, the
floaters are those belonging to the residual group in the years 1973 to 1981, and those having
managed or freely floating exchange rates in the years 1982 to 1995.
There is also the question of how to treat the countries participating in the European
“snake” in the mid-seventies, and the EMS after that.
4 These countries have mutually fixed
exchange rates, but float jointly against other currencies. In the context of this article, they
certainly belong to the group of “fixed exchange rate regimes”. It can be argued that they
were free to drop out of the system and adopt floating exchange rates at any time, and
therefore are not different from other fixers. However, one might argue that the decision by
these countries to fix their exchange rates is just as much a result of political considerations as
of purely economical ones. In addition, the inherent reciprocity makes it easier for a member-
country to withstand speculative attacks on its currency. This suggests that membership in the
EMS should decrease the hazard for adopting a flexible exchange rate system – a hypothesis
that will be tested by including a time-constant dummy for EMS-membership.
To measure duration in the fixed exchange rate regime, we have to choose a starting
point. To avoid the problem of left censoring it is important that the starting point coincides
with the time the countries entered the risk group. We have therefore chosen 1973 as our
starting point. This year saw the end of the Bretton Woods era, and the member countries10
were now in principle free to choose which exchange rate regime to adopt. Of course there
were exceptions: Canada had had a floating exchange rate since 1970, and some countries had
broken out of Bretton Woods in 1972. These countries are omitted from the analysis. The
remaining countries enter the risk group in the beginning of 1973, and – as exchange rate
regime is observed at the end of the year – may also have a transition during this first year.
We must also define what should constitute a transition. The basic idea in this article is
that the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates is a fundamental change, taking place
after careful consideration of the alternatives. As a consequence we do not want to call it a
transition if a country – because of speculation – decides to let the currency float for a while,
and then peg it at a new parity. To avoid this problem we define a transition as taking place in
the first of at least two subsequent years of floating exchange rates.
Capital mobility is difficult to measure. Earlier authors have used the ratio of foreign
assets of the banking system to the money supply, or the ratio of gross private capital flows to
gross domestic product. Following Rose (1996) we have instead used information taken from
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Here the
existence/non-existence of 5 different restrictions on capital mobility is reported.  In the
analysis we represent capital mobility by four time-varying dummy variables  indicating
respectively no restrictions, one restriction, two restrictions, or three restrictions. The
reference group is four or five restrictions, i.e. with the lowest degree of capital mobility (only
two countries had a year with all five restrictions).
The other explanatory variables are defined as follows.
•  For openness we have used the ratio of total trade (export + import) to gross domestic
product. The data is taken from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).
                                                                                                                                                        
4 In the final selection of countries these are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.11
•  Size is measured by U.S. dollar GDP in 1990-prices, taken from IFS.
•  The degree of structural concentration is measured by the percentage of the largest single
export category in total exports. The categories are on 3-digit SITC-level, and the data is
taken from UN’s  Handbook of international trade and development, and International
trade statistics yearbook.
•  For the degree of geographical concentration of the external sector we have used the
percentage of the largest single export destination in total exports. Again the source is
UN’s International trade statistics yearbook.
•  The inflation differential  is the absolute value of the difference between the country’s
inflation rate and the world average. The data for this variable are taken from IFS.
After omitting countries with incomplete data from the beginning of the period
5, we
are left with 56 countries from the original 112 IMF-members. These 56 countries are listed in
the appendix. Countries with missing data at the end of the period  are treated as right-
censored in the last year with a complete set of variables.
Before the final adjustments for the duration analysis, we take a closer look at two of
the more important explanatory factors – openness and capital mobility. We have summarized
capital mobility as an index where 0 means that all five restrictions are applied, and so forth,
with the maximum value of 5 indicating no capital restrictions. In  Figure 1 we show the
development over time of the means of openness and the capital mobility index.
(Figure 1 about here)
One might expect openness to show an increasing trend, but this is not supported by
the data. As for capital mobility such a trend is identifiable. The figure clearly shows that the
surviving fixed exchange regimes (censored) are more open than the countries that had chosen
                                                
5 An example is Romania with missing data on exports, imports and GDP in the years 1973 to 1979.12
a floating exchange rate (transition).  Apparently, the increasing degree of capital mobility
stems from the floaters. The surviving fixed exchange regimes seem to have had a high but
stable degree of capital mobility. This is further scrutinized in the bottom box of Figure 1.
Here we see that for the censored group capital mobility has increased since the mid-eighties
for the EMS-countries, but decreased for the rest of the censored group.
Discarding the countries characterized by ”crawling peg” (Chile and Uruguay) and
those who did not enter the risk group in 1973 (England, Canada and Italy) leaves us with 51.
The variables are observed annually, so there are a total of 666 observations (”country-
years”). The mean duration in the fixed exchange rate regime is 13 years, including 14 spells
that were censored between 1991 and 1995. In Table 2 descriptive statistics for the exogenous
variables are presented.
(Table 2 about here)
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The main purpose of this article is to decide how the hazard for a transition from a fixed to a
floating exchange rate regime depends on  economic criteria. Our empirical approach –
duration analysis – allows for the possibility that this hazard is  time-dependent. Economic
theory gives no indication of such a relationship. We will therefore subject the question of
time dependency to statistical testing.
As suggested in Section 2, we test a time-varying baseline hazard ( t g in equation (6)
varies over time) against a time constant baseline ( , g g = t all t). Because the hazard cannot be
estimated for a year during which no transition occurs, transitions are grouped in three-year13
intervals.
6 Furthermore,  we will also estimate the models with a dummy for the EMS-
members. We thus report estimates from three models in Table 3:
(1)  Constant baseline ( , g g = t all t)
(2)  Time-varying baseline
(3)  Constant baseline with EMS-dummy
(Table 3 about here)
As indicated in Table 3, the likelihood ratio test of Model 2 against Model 1 does not
reject the null hypothesis of a constant baseline hazard. (The test statistic  is  10.79 and
distributed as chi-squared with 6 degrees of freedom, with a critical value of 12.59 at the 5%
significance level.) Even though the test is in  favour of model (1), the coefficients on the
explanatory variables are not dramatically affected – the estimates in model (1) and (2) lie
within 95% confidence intervals of each other.
Turning now to the effects of the explanatory variables in Model 1 , we find that
openness and size are statistically significant at the 1% level.  The  inflation differential  is
significant at the 5% level. The dummies for capital restrictions are not significant.
7 Openness
has a  negative effect on the hazard, while size and the  inflation differential  increase  the
hazard.
Turning to model (3), which includes the EMS-dummy,
8 we see that the dummy is
significant at the 5% level. This is also supported by the likelihood ratio test, which gives a
chi-squared statistic of 7.38 with one degree of freedom (critical value = 6.63 at the 1% level
                                                
6 There were no transitions during the years 1974, 1975, 1981, 1984, 1986-1988, and 1995. Altogether there are
seven   intervals. The length of the final interval is 5 years.
7 We have also estimated the models with the dummy variables replaced by the index used in Figure 1, with all
over similar results. The effect of the capital mobility index was estimated negative and significant at the 10%
level in Model 1.
8 We have also estimated a model with this dummy  and a time-varying baseline hazard, but failed to reject the
hypothesis of a constant baseline hazard. Therefore, the results from this model are not reported.14
of significance). The negative sign of the dummy indicates that membership in the EMS
decreases the hazard of adopting a floating exchange rate.
We have also tried other specifications of the baseline hazard – among them a
monotonically increasing or decreasing baseline. As none of these performed better than the
constant baseline, the results from these estimations are not reported. All the models have also
been estimated with a dummy for developing/industrial countries
9, but this dummy was not
significant in either of the models. We have also tested for neglected heterogeneity and found
no evidence of this.
10 In conclusion, model (3) is the preferred one.
The negative effects of capital mobility are in opposition to the prevalent view that a
high degree of capital mobility makes it difficult to defend a fixed exchange rate (Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995)). However, in our preferred model (3), none of the dummies for capital
restrictions are statistically significant.
To compare the relative importance of the  other  variables we have calculated the

















where  k x  is the mean of the k´th variable as reported in Table 2. The estimated elasticities are
presented in Table 4.
(Table 4 about here)
According to McKinnon (1963) and Krugman (1990), we would expect increasing
openness to decrease the hazard for adopting a floating exchange rate regime. This is strongly
supported by the data: Openness is significant at the 5% level, and has an estimated elasticity
                                                
9 Grouped according to International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1993.15
of -1.29 – the highest of all. This is also the relationship found in all the earlier studies when
this variable was significant.
Although size is significant at the 1% level, the estimated elasticity is only 0.19. The
positive effect of size on the hazard accords with what was found in all the earlier studies.
Even  though in the theory there  is disagreement as to the effect of  structural
concentration, all earlier studies have found a negative relation between this variable and
flexibility of the exchange rate regime. The same effect is also found in this study, with an
elasticity of -0.29. However, this variable is not significant.
Geographical concentration is found to have a positive influence on the hazard. This
effect is the opposite of what the theory predicted, and none of the earlier studies have found a
significant positive relation between this variable and floating exchange rate. The elasticity is
0.26, but the variable is not significant in this study.
There is more agreement regarding the effect of inflation differential: an inflation rate
that strongly deviates from that of the rest of the world makes it difficult to fix the exchange
rate. This relation is supported by all the earlier empirical studies, as well as by the present.
The estimated elasticity is 0.25.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study it is tried to explain the large increase in floating exchange rate regimes that we
have experienced the last decades. Our econometric approach is duration analysis, which is an
improvement compared to earlier studies which used cross-sectional techniques.  
In the earlier studies the country size, the inflation differential and structural
concentration turned out to be the most successful variables in explaining the frequency of
                                                                                                                                                        
10 The test is for gamma-distributed neglected heterogeneity, cf. Meyer (1990).16
floating regimes. We confirm the importance of country size and inflation differential, but not
structural concentration.  However, the variable that showed up most powerful in our analysis
is the openness of a country.  The importance of this variable accords with the youngest part
of the theoretical literature on optimum currency areas, cf. Krugman (1990).
Our sample includes 51 countries.  Of these, 6 (11.8%) countries were floaters in
1973.  In 1995 the number of floaters had grown to 39 (76.5%).  The 12 countries that have
survived with a fixed exchange rate  are  mainly  the  EMS-countries  –  Austria,  Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – and the EMS-related country
Cyprus. In addition we have one country with a dollar-peg – Panama – and three countries
with a currency-basket – Jordan, Malta and Thailand. Except for Germany these countries are
characterised as small open economies with low or moderate inflation rates. According to our
analysis these three characteristics count in favour of a fixed exchange rate. But this sample of
fixed exchange rate economies also indicates that this may not be enough. Co-operation may
be at least as important.17













Chile Omitted Australia 1976 Trans.
Costa Rica 1980 Trans. Austria 1994 Cens.
Cyprus 1995 Cens. Belgium 1994 Cens.
Dominican Rep. 1985 Trans. Canada Omitted
Ecuador 1983 Trans. Denmark 1995 Cens.
El Salvador 1989 Trans. Finland 1992 Trans.
Ethiopia 1991 Cens. France 1973 Trans.
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Honduras 1990 Trans. Ireland 1995 Cens.
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Israel 1977 Trans. Luxembourg 1992 Cens.
Jamaica 1983 Trans. Netherlands 1995 Cens.
Jordan 1995 Cens. New Zealand 1979 Trans.
Kenya 1993 Trans. Norway 1992 Trans.
Korea 1980 Trans. Portugal 1973 Trans.
Malaysia 1973 Trans. Spain 1977 Trans.
Malta 1992 Cens. Sweden 1992 Trans.
Mauritius 1994 Trans. United Kingdom Omitted
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The countries are grouped into “developing” and “industrial” according to the classification in  International
Financial Statistics Yearbook 1993.18
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Capital mobility +/- + - + - -
Openness - - - - + - - +
Size + + + + + +
Structural conc. +/- - - - - -
Geographical conc. - - - - - - + +
Inflation differential + + + + +
Econ. development + + + -
Countries 73 88 75 64 92 39 140
Developing(D)/Indus
trial (I) countries
D&I D D&I D&I D D D&I
+ indicates a positive relationship.
- indicates a negative relationship.
Dark shaded cells indicate 5% significance level
Brighter shaded cells indicate 10% significance level





Openness 0.780 0.417 0.094 2.119
Size 1.13e+11 3.02e+11 6.96e+08 3.70e+12
Structural concentration 29.034 19.758 4.4 94.4
Geographical  concentration 28.862 14.873 4.9 79.7
Inflation differential 8.607 7.914 0.028 103.494
# capital restrictions: Frequency Percent Cumulative
                                   0 105 15.77 15.77
                                   1 314 47.15 62.91
                                   2 114 17.12 80.03
                                   3 93 13.96 93.99
                                   4 38 5.71 99.7
                                   5 2 0.3 100TABLE 3 Maximum likelihood estimates of the hazard models with asymptotic 
standard errors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
3 capital restrictions
a -0.436 0.666 -0.634 0.672 -0.499 0.681
2 capital restrictions 0.090 0.654 -0.130 0.653 0.141 0.659
1 capital restriction -0.615 0.618 -0.921 0.646 -0.570 0.622
No capital restr. -1.526 0.945 -2.453** 1.091 -0.220 0.926
Openness -1.874*** 0.666 -2.397*** 0.715 -1.655** 0.659
Size 1.08E-12*** 4.07E-13 1.27E-12*** 4.46E-13 1.66E-12*** 6.31E-13
Structural
concentration
-0.008 0.010 -0.008 0.011 -0.010 0.010
Geographical
concentration
0.015 0.011 0.020* 0.011 0.009 0.012
Inflation differential 0.027** 0.012 0.021* 0.012 0.029** 0.012
EMS -3.216** 1.394








N 666 666 666







*/**/*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level (based on the normal distribution)
aReference: 4-5 capital restrictions
Likelihood ratio tests: Model 2 against Model 1: 10.79 (chi-squared, DF=6)







The elasticities are based on the estimated coefficients
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Year
Transition Censored All








1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Year
EMS Other censored All censored